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FORUM
H

W FACTORS ISSUES OF THE AIRCRAFT CHECKLIST
Patrick Ross

INTRODUCTION
Formal checklists have beensusedin aircraft since before World War 11. As aircraft developed and became more and
more complicated, the checklist became more important. Modern cockpits have become so complex that it would be
impossible to operate such aircraft without checklists.
Even though flight crews are trained in the use and importance of checklists, accidents still occur in which misuse
of the checklist or poor checklist design are contributing factors. Proper checklist use and optimum checklist design
are human factors issues. Degam and Wiener (1994) point out that until very recently, checklists have not undergone
en~ughscrutiny and analysis by the human factors profession. The premise of this paper is that flight safety can be
enhanced by proper checklist usage and good checklist design.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
General
Use and design of the aircraft checklist seems like a
simple matter, however, there are many aspects to the
checklist. Only recently have researchers begun to study
the human factors issuesassociatedwith aircraftchecklists.
As of 1991 there were 228 aircraft accidents in the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) records in which
checklistmisusewas a contributingfactor (Sumwalt, 1991).
Additionally, there are numerous checklist related reports
in NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
database.

When one studies these accidentlincident reports, it
becomes clear that when the checklist is not used in the
proper manner, or there are design flaws in the checklist,
there can be serious consequences.
Sumwalt (1991) reminds us that there are good checklist
techniques and bad checklist techniques. Sumwalt also
categorizes checklist misuse into four categories. One,
sometimes a crewmember,for various reasons, simply does
not do the checklist. Two, the crewmember performs the
checklist, but misses an item. Three, a crewmember
responds that an item is checked or set, but the item really
is not checked or set. Four, the checklist is started but is
intermpted and not completed.
Check List Objectives
An aircraft checklist is a list used by the crew to make
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sure the aircraft is in the proper configuration for a given
phase of flight. These phases of flight include takeoff,
climb, cruise, descent, approach, and landing.
The takeoff, approach, and landing pbases are of
particular importance. They make up 27 percent of an
average flight, but account for 76.3 percent of accidents
(Degani and Wiener, 1990).
The Challenge and Response checklist method is the
routine most commonly used by the airlines. In thisroutine
the designated pilot calls out a checklist item (switch or
lever). This is the challenge. The pilot responsible for that
item then responds by finding, grasping, and moving the
item into the position called for.
Degani and Wiener (1990) remind us that from the
human factors perspective, the checklist provides an
interface between man and machine. The authors go on to
list several objectives of the a i r d checklist as follows:
1. Help the pilot accurately configure the aircraft for
flight phase.
2. Provide a systematic method to verifil
configuration, even if the crew is fatigued.
3. Provide a systematic and convenient eye scan of
cockpit panels.
4. Provide a sequential framework to meet cockpit
operational requirements.
5. Provide a method of crewmembercross checking.
6. Provide a systematic method of configuring the
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aimaft, keeping all m e m b e r s in the loop.
7. Provide a method of optimum crew coordination
and distribution of cockpit workload.
8. Provide a quality control tool that can be used to
evaluate pilots.
9. Promote a positive attitude about checklist use
and safety.
Reasonsfor Deviationsfrom Check&ts
Distractions. Distraction is the most obvious reason for
deviations fkom the checklist. When emergency or
abnormal situations arise, the checklist can be forgotten or
interrupted. Since ch&klist initiation is usually tied to
external cues, the checklist is sometimes forgotten when
these cues are missing, or are different.
In addition to distractions. Degani and Wiener (1994)
discuss four factors why trained and standardized
professional pilots deviate from standard operating
procedures (SOP) and checklists. These factors are as
follows:
Individualism. No matter how well-trained pilots are,
they are individuals and will impose that individuality on
a pn>cedure or checklist. In some cases this individualism
does not effect safety or may even enhance safety.
However, in other cases, safety is compromised. The
bottom line here is that there exists the possibility of
conflict between individualism and standardization. An
example where individuality and the flexibility of the
human mind were useful was in the Siow City DC-10
accident. In this case, the crew had to improvise an
emergency procedure because it did not exist in the
emergency checklist.
Complacency. Many studies have shown that pilots can
become complacent. This complacency is caused by the
inherent error tolerance of the aviation system and the fact
that most pilots in the day-to-day routine of flying face few
emergenciesor abnormal circumstances. Thisc o m p b c y
or easing up can be made worse by fatigue. Lately, human
factors researchers have noticed what they call automation
complacency. This is a type of complacency in which the
pilot becomes too trusting of the cockpit automation
(Pamwmaq Molly, and Singh, 1991).
Humor. Some pilots like to add variety and humor into
the cockpit atmosphere. They do this because the cockpit
atmosphere is inherently boring and humorless. To some
extent, a little humor in the cockpit may be a good thing.
however, it can cause problems. Degani and Wiener (1994)
p i n t out the case in which a pilot on the ground,

requesting his clearance, asked for "federal aidn to St.
Louis. "Federal aid" was substituted for FAA clearance as
a joke. The controller thought the aircraft was being
hijacked. The FBI and the police were called to the
aircraft. In the associated ASRS report, the pilot
emphasized that he would use absolute standard
phraseology in the future. Other cases sighted by Degani
and Wiener are pilots saying "gasoline" instead of "fuel"
and "uno mas" instead of "one thousand feet" (more to
level off). These non-standard callouts force pilots to make
unnecessary interpretations during high risk operations.
This, in turn, makes it difiicult to standardize cockpit
procedure.
Frustration. When a task or procedure is frustrating,
pilots tend to find ways to work around it. Degani and
Wiener (1994) note the example of the oxygen mask.
Oxygen masks are uncomfortable and hard to replace in
their holders. Regulations require that when one pilot
leaves the cockpit above 25,000 feet, the remaining pilot
must put on the oxygen mask. Since this task is frustrating
to the pilots, some will abandon the standard climb
procedure and ask for a level off at 25,000 feet until the
other pilot returns to the cockpit. This non-standard
procedure costs extra fuel and ties up the Air traffic Control
(ATC) system.
Design
Even though there have been some accidents in
which checklist readability may have been a contributing
factor, research into checklist design(has begun only
recently. Checklist design is interesting in that few people
can agree on a standard. Even after aircraft manufacturers
spend much time and money developing checklists, the
airlines that buy the aircraft fresuently produce their own
checklist changing everything fkom type style and paper
color to actual procechve sequences.
The researcher has personally witnessed checklist
development meetings in which engineers, test pilots,
training personnel, and Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) officials could not agree on issues such as paper
size, decision tree format, and level of detail. Sometimes
these meetings can even become emotionally charged due
to strongly held opinions and beliefs.
It is refkeshing that Degani of the NASA Ames
Research Center has studied the problem of checklist
design and has come up with some hard data. Using the
data, Degani has developed guidelines for optimum
checklist design. These guidelines will be discussed later
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in this paper.
EXAMPLES OF THE PROBLEM
Detroit Accident
In August of 1987 a Northwest Airlines MD-82 crashed
just after breaking ground from Detroit Metro airport. The
NTSB report showed that the flaps were not set for takeoff.
When the aircraft broke ground, there was not enough lift
to sustain flight and the aircraft crashed killing all but one.
Normally, a mistake like this is caught when the crew
performs the taxi checklist. In this case the crew did not
perform the taxi checklist.
From cockpit voice recorder transcripts, the NTSB
concluded that the first officer was initiating the checklists
even though Northwest SOPS spec@ that the captain
should initiate them. Because the first officer became busy
during a long taxi with a last minute runway change, he
was distracted and did not initiate the taxi checklist. The
NTSB concluded "the captain's passive involvement with
checklist initiation did not provide a backup to the first
officer's memory" (Sumwalt, 1991). The NTSB went on to
say that because the pilots were dishacted with the runway
change, the aircraft ended up at a location on the airport
where external cues and referem were not the same ones
normally associated with initiation of a taxi checklist.
New OrleansAccident
In May of 1987, an Air New Orleans BAe-3 101took off
from New Orleans International Airport on a scheduled
commuter flight. Just after takeoff, the aircraftexperienced
Severe yaw and engine power surges. An emergency
landing was made straight head. The aircraft overran the
runway, crossed a highway, and ended up crashing into
several cars. The NTSB determined that the engine RPM
leven were not in the proper position for takeoff and
questioned the crew's checklist discipline (Degani, 1992).
Although the NTSB cwM not prove that checklisttype face
size was a factor, they did note that the Air New Orleans
checklist typeface was 57 percent smaller than that
recommended by human engineering criteria.
LaGuardia Accident
In March of 1994, a Continental Airlines MD-82 was
damaged when it ran off the end of the runway at
LaGuardia Airport in New York. The airplane ended up
beyond the runway on top of a tidal mud flat in Flushing
Bay. Twenty-nine passengers ended up with minor injuries
and $5.63 million worth of damage was done to the aircraft
(Internet, 19%).
The captain had rejected the takeoff because he noticed

the ampeed indication stop at 60 knots, jump to 80, then
return to 60. The runway was somewhat icy.
The crew had delayed starting the second engine during
taxi out (against SOPS). Because of this, the crew hurried
the takeoff preparations and missed several items on the
checklist. The investigation that followed revealed that the
crew missed one very important item, the pitotJstaticsystem
heat. This heating system is used to keep ice off of the
iced
airspeed sensors. Because the system was -ally
over, the airspeed readings were wrong. This caused the
pilot to abort the takeoff. A contributing cause was the
captain's failure to recognize the erroneous airspeed
reading soon enough.
Bryce, Uiah Accident
In 1983, a Republic Airlines MD-82 was cruising at
35,000 feet, 20 miles north of Bryce, Utah when both
engines stopped. The crew did an emergency descent,
performed the proper cheddist and turned on ail fuel boost
pumps. At about 12,000 feet, the crew got both engines
restarted and accomplished a successll diversion to Las
Vegas. It turned out that the engines had stopped because
both main fuel tanks on each wing were empty. The restof
the fuel was in the center tank, but could not get to the
engines because the center tank fuel boost pumps had not
been turned on per the climb checklist. The NTSB
concluded that during the takeoff, one of the autopilot
knobs came off, distracting both pilots enough so that the
captain called for the CLIMB checklistout of nonnal order.
When the captain did call for the climb checklist, the first
officer received a radio call. The combination of the
checklist being out of order, coupled with some minor
distractions, causedthe first officer to miss the center-tankboost-pumps-on checklist item.
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Checklist Uscge
There are several techniques that can be used to insure
that the checklists are used in the optimum manner. A
checklist should be initiated only by the designated
crewmember. This lessens the impact of distractions and
reliance on another m e m b e r ' s memory to self-initiate
a checklist. If the designated initiator forgets, then the
other m e m b e r can say something like "are you ready
for the checklist?"
Checklists should be initiated during times of low
workload, if possible. For example, Degani and Wiener
(1991) state that the taxi checklist should be accomplished
as close to the gate as possible and as far from the active
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runway as possible. This is because the probability of
completing the checklist becomes less and less as the
aircraft gets closer and closer to the runway.
Calling for the checklist should be done immediately
following specific cues or events. For example, the After
Takeoff checklist might be called for just after retracting
the flaps or the Landing checklist might be called for just
after lowering the landing gear. Caution must be used
however, since in times of abnormal situations, the usual
cues may not be available.
Standard checklist nomenclature should always be used
by both the challenger 'and the responder. Hand signals
should never be used. Humorous phrases should be
avoided, especially by the captam. Humomus phrases used
by the captain could give the crew the impression that the
checklist is not important.
When a checklist is interrupted for any reason, the
checklist should be stopped by the responding pilot. A
good way to stop a checklist would be to say "stop it at flaps
(or gear, etc)". This is referred to as an "explicit hold" on
the checklist (Sumwalt, 1991). One simulator study of
checklist interruption shows that explicit holds after an
interruption can help a crew return to the checklist and
complete it (Sumwalt, 1991).
After a checklist has been completed, the challenging
crewmember should announce that the checklist is
complete. This emphasizesthe end of the checklist so that
the crew can move on to other cockpit duties
ChecklistDesign
In addition to the human factors issues associated with
checklist usage, there are also human factors issues
associated with checklist design. For example, if the print
is too small, or the nomenclature is not standardized, a
checklist loses it effectiveness.
The checklist should not contain words that are
ambiguous. Degani and Wiener (1990) inspected several
checklists and noted usage of ambiguousterms such as set,
check, and complete. Checklist nomenclature should
always state the actual status or value of the item. For
example, when calling out airspeed bugs, it is better to say
"V1 121" instead of "V1 set."
Checklists should use consistent, standardized
nomenclature. When an airline has different types of
aircraft (especially from different manufacturers) the
nomenclature can he confusing One checklist may use the
tenn throttles, and another may say power levers.
Nomenclature can even vary between types of checklists.
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For example the normal checklist may say fire handles and
the emergency checklist may say ENG FIRE handles.
Degani (1992) points out that the two important factors
that a checklist designer should consider are legibility of
print and readability. A legible print is one that allows the
reader to quickly and positively identify each individual
character. Degani says that legibility depends on
"character stroke width, form of characters, illumination on
the page, and contrast between the characters and the
background."
Readability is a characteristic that allows the pilot to
rapidly recognize singlewords, word-groups, abbreviations,
and symbols. Degani says that readability depends on "the
spacing of individualcharacters, spacing of words, spacing
of lines, and the ratio of character area to background
area."
Legibility and readability are very important for
checklists because cockpits have a variety of lighting
conditions due to the changing sunlight situations, pilots
must frequently shift their eye focus between near and far
when reading charts and looking for tra&lc, distractions
and abnormal situationsfrequently imermpt normal cockpit
procedures, and pilots are of many different ages with
varying seeing ability.
Degani (1992) lists several criteria for the optimum
design for checklists. The researcher will paraphrase some
of the highlights of these criteria as follows:
1. Fonts should be of the sans (without)-serif style.
2. Fonts that have similar looking charactersshould
not be used.
3. Dot matrix type print should not be used.
4. Long strings of text should be in lower case.
5. When using upper case, the first letter of the
word should be larger.
6. Font height-to-width ratio should be about 5:3.
7. The vertical spacing between lines should be at
least 25-33 percent of the overall font size.
8. The horizontal spacing between characters
should be 25 percent of the overall size and at
least one stroke width.
9. Do not use long strings of words in italics.
10. Do not use more than one or two typefhces for
emphasis.
11. Use black characters on a white or yellow
background.
12. Avoid black on dark red, green, or blue.
13. Use anti-glare plastic to laminate documents.
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14. Make sure that the print quality is excellent.
15. When developinga checklist, the designer should

determine what pilot age group will be using the
checklist and then take a conservative approach
in using information obtained from graphs and
research data.
CONCLUSIONS
Aircrafl accidents have occurred in the past in which
misuse of the checklist was a factor. These accidents may
have been avoided if more emphasis had been placed on
checklist use during initial and recurrent training.
Checklists are an important a!&xt ofaviation's system of
safety backups. They must be treated seriously. As aircraft
become more and more technologically sophisticated,
checklists become even more important.
Deviations from checklists can be caused by distractions,
individualism, complacency ,humor, and frustration. One
way to minimize the effects of the above factors is to
remarly and methodologically use a standard checklist
routine.
The checklist should be initiated by the designated
crewmember at specific times during the flight. The crew
should keep in mind that abnormal situations can result in

an absence of the usual checklist cues.
Checklist design is a factor that should be considered by
anyone developing a checklist. Type style, type size, paper
color, and other characteristics can have an impact on
usability.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Flight safety can be enhanced by proper checklist usage
and good checklist design, if the following
recommendations are followed. One, the importance of
checklists should always be emphasized during crew
training, especially during Cockpit Resource Management
(CRM)training andLineOrientedFlight Training(LOFT).
Two, during training, crews should be reminded of
situations in which the checklist can be misused due to
interruptions of abnormal situations, Three, funding
should be provided so that researchers can continue
evaluating checklist design. Four, airlines should attempt
to standardizechecklistsas much as possible across various
fleet aircraft types. Five, the Air Transport Association
should sponsor a program in which the airlinesget together
and standardize checklist design..)
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